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TORTS - PRIVATE CITIZEN ATTEMPTING TO ARREST
FELON LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENT ACTS TOWARD INNOCENT THIRD PARTIES. Giant Food, Inc. v. Scherry, 51 Md. App.
586, 444 A.2d 483 (1982).

A security guard employed by Giant Food, Inc. (Giant) witnessed
an armed robbery in a supermarket.' The guard pursued the suspect to
a parking lot and ordered him to stop. The suspect responded by waving a gun into the air. When the guard repeated his warning to stop,
the suspect lowered his weapon and jumped into a car. As the vehicle
pulled away, the armed security guard fired two shots. The first bullet,

aimed at the driver's window, hit the rear panel of the car. The second
bullet, aimed at the back windshield, hit the living room window of a

fifth floor apartment across the street. The apartment's occupant, Geraldine Scherry, had entered the living room at the precise moment the
glass shattered. In a civil suit brought in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Scherry contended that Giant was vicariously liable
due to the negligence of its guard in firing the second shot. The jury

agreed, and awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages for the physical and emotional trauma she suffered as a result of the incident.2
On appeal, Giant contested its liability on several grounds. First,
Giant claimed that the trial court should have granted a directed verdict in its favor because the security guard was privileged to use
deadly force while apprehending the criminal suspect, thereby insulating Giant from claims by third persons.3 Second, Giant argued that,
even if the case was properly before the jury, the lower court should
have instructed the jury that the guard was privileged to use deadly
force if the court found the guard was preventing the commission or
consummation of a felony.' The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland rejected these arguments in Giant Food,Inc. v. Scherry5 and held
that even if the security guard was privileged to shoot at the fleeing
suspect, he was still liable to the plaintiff because the circumstances
surrounding the firing of the second shot raised inferences of negligence from which the jury could rationally conclude that the guard
created an unreasonable risk of harm to innocent bystanders.6
The rule delineating a private citizen's or law enforcement person1. Giant Food, Inc. v. Scherry, 51 Md. App. 586, 587, 444 A.2d 483, 484 (1982).
2. Although Scherry was not actually hit by either the bullet or the glass, she did
suffer nausea, insomnia, headaches, and general mental and emotional distress
because she feared someone was attempting to kill her. Id at 587, 444 A.2d at
485.
3. Id at 588, 444 A.2d at 485.
4. Id Giant also claimed that the trial court erred when it allowed an expert witness
to answer a hypothetical question without sufficient facts to support it. In addi-

tion, Giant contended that the trial court gave a faulty instruction concerning
damages. The appellate court dismissed both of these arguments. Id at 595-96,
444 A.2d at 489.

5. 51 Md. App. 586, 444 A.2d 483 (1982).

6. Id at 594, 444 A.2d at 488.
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nel's liability when his actions result in unintentional injury to third
persons is fairly uniform.7 For example, one early case indicates that
the right to arrest a suspect "would not necessarily relieve the [arrestor]
of liability if he were guilty of failing to exercise due care for the safety
of bystanders." 8 Similarly, courts have reasoned that the arrestor's
duty to protect society cannot be ignored merely because of the privilege to make an arrest.9 The first Restatement of Torts comports with

these early cases. It states that an actor privileged to make an arrest is
only liable for injuries to third persons if he realizes or should realize
that his act creates an unreasonable risk of causing injury.' 0 The Restatement suggests that in determining the actor's awareness of the unreasonable risk he has created, the fact-finder should consider all the

surrounding circumstances.II
Courts have emphasized several important factors which should
be considered in determining the reasonableness of the arrestor's acts,
but the underlying theme in every case is that the utility of the arrest
must outweigh the risk of harm to the public.' 2 For instance, some

cases have indicated that when the nature of the crime justifying the
arrest presents little immediate danger to society, the arrestor should
exercise great caution.' 3 Similarly, when the attempted arrest occurs at
a time or place when injury to the public is likely, the arrestor must
7. Many of the cases involve injuries caused by the negligent acts of police officers.
See Greenstone, Liability of Police Officers for Misuse of Their Weapons, 16
CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 397 (1967). But see infra note 29 for the minimal effect this
rule has on police officers in Maryland.
8. Shaw v. Lord, 41 Okla. 347, 353, 137 P. 885, 887 (1914); see also Edgin v. Talley,
169 Ark. 662, 276 S.W. 591 (1925); Askay v. Maloney, 85 Or. 333, 166 P. 29
(1917),rev'd on other grounds, 92 Or. 566, 179 P. 899 (1919), rev'd on othergrounds
sub nom Anderson v. Maloney, 111 Or. 84, 225 P. 318 (1924).
9. Edgin v. Talley, 169 Ark. 662, 671, 276 S.W. 591, 594 (1925); Shaw v. Lord, 41
Okla. 347, 351, 137 P. 885, 887 (1914); Askay v. Maloney, 85 Or. 333, 339, 166 P.
29, 31 (1917), rev'd on othergrounds, 92 Or. 566, 179 P. 899 (1919), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom Anderson v. Maloney, 111 Or. 84, 225 P. 318 (1924).

10. The

RESTATEMENT

provides:

An act which is privileged for the purpose of protecting the actor from a
harmful or offensive contact or other invasion of his interests of personality does not subject the actor to liability to a third party for any harm
unintentionally done to him unless the actor realizes or should realize
that his act creates an unreasonable risk of causing such harm.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 75 comment b (1934). This comment is incorporated
by reference into section 137 of the RESTATEMENT.
11. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 137 comment c (1934).
12. Cerri v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 831, 834 (N.D. Cal. 1948); Davis v. Heliwig, 21
N.J. 412, 416, 122 A.2d 497, 501 (1956). See generaly Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 873
(1958).
13. See, e.g., Cerri v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 831, 834 (N.D. Cal. 1948) (military
guard negligent in shooting at a civilian trespasser and injuring innocent third
person); Heidbreder v. Northampton Township Trustees, 64 Ohio App. 2d 95, 99,
411 N.E.2d 825, 828 (1979) (police officer negligent for firing at fleeing felon when
danger not imminent).
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display greater care. 4 A lower standard of care is permitted, however,
when the arrestor is confronted with an emergency situation. 5 Acts
performed under stress should not be judged by an inflexible standard;
instead, the defendant should be entitled to a jury instruction that will
account for this stress. However, an actor may not benefit from this
instruction if, through his negligence, he created the emergency. 6
In Giant Food, Inc. v. Scherry, '7 a case of first impression, the
Maryland court of special appeals delineated the standard that should
apply in determining an arrestor's liability when his negligent acts injure an innocent party. The court considered the security guard to be a
private citizen attempting a citizen's arrest.' 8 After noting that the
guard enjoyed the right to make the arrest,' 9 the appellate court examined whether excessive force was used. The court suggested that an
inference could be raised that the guard was not justified in using
deadly force since the felony suspect was fleeing, and therefore
presented little immediate danger to either the guard or the surrounding public.2 0 However, the court did not rest its decision on this inference alone. The court believed that even if the guard had been justified
in using deadly force against the suspect, further inquiry into the
guard's liability was necessary. 2 ' The Giant court adopted section 137
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as the proper standard in determining the guard's liability. 2 This section indicates that when making
an arrest, the actor has a dual responsibility of not using excessive force
against the prospective arrestee and not endangering the nearby public
through negligent conduct.2 3 The court concluded that this standard of
14. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Rice, 40 Colo. App. 481, 82 P.2d 1261, 1262 (1978) (discharging firearm into large crowd); Davis v. Hellwig, 21 N.J. 412, 416, 122 A.2d 497,
501 (1956) (shooting at thief on busy streetcomer); Shaw v. Lord, 41 Okla. 347,
352-53, 137 P. 885, 886 (1914) (attempting arrest in a restaurant during dinner
hour).
15. Eg., United States v. Jasper, 222 F.2d 632, 633 (4th Cir. 1955) (military police
surrounded by angry mob); Cleveland v. City of Miami, 263 So. 2d 573, 578 (Fla.
1972) (police officers moving through neighborhood after riot); Graham v. Ogden,
157 So. 2d 365, 367 (La. App. 1963) (deputy attacked by intoxicated individual
during attempted arrest).
16. Dyson v. Schmidt, 206 Minn. 129, 136, 109 N.W.2d 262, 268 (1961) (police officer
negligently caused shootout in crowded theatre lobby).
17. 51 Md. App. 586, 444 A.2d 483 (1982).
18. Id at 589, 444 A.2d at 485.
19. The security guard had probable cause to make the arrest since he actually witnessed the armed robbery. See Stevenson v. State, 287 Md. 504, 520, 413 A.2d
1340, 1349 (1980).
20. Giant, 51 Md. App. at 589, 444 A.2d at 486. If the guard was not privileged to use
deadly force against the felon, he would be liable to anyone he might injure. See
Note, The CivilLiability of Peace Officersfor Wounding or Killing, 28 U. CIN. L.
REv. 488, 495 (1959).
21. Giant, 51 Md. App. at 589, 444 A.2d at 486.
22. Id Section 137 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) is similar to
section 137 of the first RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1934). See supra note 10.
23. Giant, 51 Md. App. at 590, 444 A.2d at 486.
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reasonableness would apply whenever there was some prospect that an
innocent party may be hurt.2 4
In its application of the Restatement's reasonableness test, the
court recognized that it was essential to consider all the circumstances
surrounding the incident to determine whether, in the situation "in
which [the guard] found himself at the moment he took the second
shot, it was reasonable for him to have fired that [second] shot."' 25 The
court noted several inferences the jury could have raised to hold the
guard liable: (1) the suspect presented no immediate danger to anyone;
(2) the security guard could have noted the license number and summoned the police; and (3) the guard was shooting in the dark at a rapidly moving target.2 6 The court found these inferences to be "clearly
ones of negligence" from which the jury could rationally conclude that
the security guard did not act reasonably.2 7
By adopting section 137 of Restatement (Second) of Torts, the
court of special appeals has aligned itself with the states that recognize
that the privilege to arrest a suspect does not necessarily protect the
arrestor from liability to third persons.28 Indeed, it would be illogical
to offer an arrestor blanket protection. The privilege to make an arrest
evolves from the special relationship between the arrestor and the suspect. Because the suspect has violated the law, he should not be protected from force that would otherwise constitute a tort. But this
justification does not apply between the actor and an innocent third
person. Any breach by the arrestor of the duty owed to the third party
should be subject to the same test that is applied in ordinary negligence
actions.
While the effect of the rule established by the Giant court will be
practically negligible in arrests made by police officers,29 the impact the
decision will have on citizen arrests should be substantial. Because of
the need to protect society from criminals, Maryland has granted broad
Id at 591, 444 A.2d at 486.
Id at 592, 444 A.2d at 487.
Id at 594, 444 A.2d at 488.
Id
Davis v. Hellwig, 21 N.J. 412, 416, 122 A.2d 497, 501 (1956); Heidbreder v. Northampton Township Trustees, 64 Ohio App. 2d 95, 99, 411 N.E.2d 825, 828 (1979).
See generally Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 1176 (1977).
29. Maryland protects police officers by granting them immunity from suits if the
injury occurred while the officer was acting in a law enforcement capacity in a
nonmalicious manner. Duncan v. Koustenis, 260 Md. 98, 106, 271 A.2d 547, 551
(1970). The State of Maryland and its political subdivisions are also protected by
sovereign immunity unless there has been an express waiver. James v. Prince
George's County, 288 Md. 315, 333, 418 A.2d 1173, 1183 (1980). The State of
Maryland has waived its immunity for injuries caused by state employees using
state property. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-403(a)(4) (Supp. 1983).
Whether this waiver includes a state police officer injuring another with a state
issued weapon is an open question.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
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powers to its citizens3 ° and licensed security guards3 ' to make arrests.
The Giant decision tempers this broad power by granting a remedy to
those who suffer an injury due to the misuse of the right to arrest. Additionally, the rule may encourage businesses to exercise more care in
hiring and training their security personnel.
Nicholas F McCoy

30. A private citizen may make a valid arrest when he has probable cause to believe
that a felony has been committed and that the person whom he arrests committed
it. Stevenson v. State, 287 Md. 504, 520, 413 A.2d 1340, 1349 (1980).
31. A special policeman has the same powers as a police officer when acting on his
employer's premises or off the premises in connection with property owned by the
employer. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 64 (1982).

